At least that's what Quine implies. But in a discourse permeated with as much a concern for linguistic philosophy as general ontology, it seems Quine makes more of a point on what can be said to be, rather than what actually is. His analysis on the subject has him cross over varying ‘schools’ of ontology, scrutinizing each and developing arguments with purportedly equal objectivity. Most notably, however, he develops the "semantical formula" “to be is to be the value of a variable”[141] not in an attempt to pinpoint which ‘school’ of ontology, or rather which ontology, is most viable, but in order to better evaluate how we should commit to an ontology.
In the tenth paragraph, Quine does away with the word ‘exist’ in favor of the simple verb ‘is’ which can also be taken as the present form of ‘to be.’ He does so in order to compensate for Wyman’s “ill-conceived effort to appear agreeable” [136] by distinguishing between existing and subsisting. Wyman’s ontology allows for what Quine considers an “overpopulated universe” by vouching for an endless regurgitation of possible values that undermine the state of existence. In allowing possibles into our ontology, we would be inviting an effect similar in nature to the idea of infinite regress. Quine elaborates on this point ad nauseam, questioning the existence of the possible bald man standing at a doorway and his relation to other possible figures with varying properties. This is where I come across my objection.
As far as I understand, which I might concede to say is not very far, Quine’s slogan or formula only argues for more convenience in ontology rather than more efficiency or truthfulness [and by truthfulness I mean, resulting in more truths]. In discerning what is, concerning one’s self only with variables that have set values would result in an ontology that disregards shifting values or values that may or may not fluctuate in and out of existence. One may only totally discover what there is by either stopping time all together, or being efficient enough to figure out all there is in one instance. However, even if either was possible, what there is one moment may not be what there is another moment, effectively creating an ever-swelling margin of error proportionate to the rate of change in the universe. I understand how this may be beside the point, but considering it thoroughly, it actually might not be, and I’ll explain why shortly.
Another issue with his formula is that it inadvertently argues for a teleological universe, or rather a universe [proverbially] ‘embedded in stone.’ If it were the case otherwise, an ontology that abides by his formula would be stuck deciphering ‘what there is after this series of circumstances’ rather than actually ‘what there is.’ That being said, using the rationale that it would be an assumption to declare the conformity between past, present and future, it would similarly be an assumption to conform to the idea that this series of circumstances, or rather the collection of happenstance, or occurrences, both macro- and micro-, that has led to what we call the present is either the only state of existence, or the only state of existence viable for examination.
To put it plainly, if the ontological question is “what is there?”, an ontology adhering to Quine’s “semantical formula” would only prove to pierce the surface. Though it can be argued that it is this surface that matters, and that as such his “semantical formula” simply acts as an aid to better examine the ontological question, this argument is a subjective one, predicated on a series of meta-ontological assumptions including the assumption that objective answers cannot be ascertained. Still, based solely on my very limited and fallible knowledge of philosophy as a whole, it seems this frustrates the point that ontology aims to find out what there is, not what there is that matters, affects, or can be perceived/understood by us.
